Common value auctions and the winner's curse / John H. Kagel and Dan Levin.
Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "...
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| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Princeton, N.J. :
Princeton University Press,
©2002.
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| Local Note: | ProQuest Ebook Central |
| Summary: | Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies su |
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| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (xvi, 401 pages) : illustrations |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| ISBN: | 9781400830138 1400830133 9780691016672 0691016674 1282158759 9781282158757 9786612158759 6612158751 |
| Language: | English. |